摘要
提出了一种基于主从博弈的碳排放税制定方法,可同时兼顾节能减排目标与电网企业经济利益,为制定相关政策提供参考.该主从博弈的上层决策者是政府机构,旨在制定最优税率方案,以最少的税收将系统的碳排放量限制在容许范围内,下层决策者是电网企业,旨在以最低的发电成本满足系统负荷需求.上述主从博弈可进一步转化为混合整数线性规划问题,并通过CPLEX进行求解.加机系统算例表明了所提模型与方法的合理性与有效性.
This paper presents a method to determine carbon tax on different gen- erating units based on Stackelberg game, which can strike a balance between carbon emission reduction and the profit of energy industry. The upper-level decision maker is the government agency who aims to limit total carbon emissions within a certain level with minimal additional cost by setting optimM tax rates for different generating units. The lower-level decision maker is the grid operator who wants to minimize the total production cost through executing an economic dispatch while considering the tax levied by the government. The Stackelberg game model is finally formulated as a mixed integer linear program and solved by CPLEX. Case studies on a 10 unit system demonstrate the validity of the proposed model and method.
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第8期1055-1067,共13页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
基金委创新群体项目(51321005)
中国电力科学研究院院士合作项目(XTB51201303968)
自然科学基金(51007041)资助课题
关键词
主从博弈
电力系统
碳排放税
混合整数线性规划
Stackelberg game, power systems, carbon emission tax, mixed-integer linear programming.
