摘要
为充分利用综合能源系统(IES)潜在的可靠性价值,延缓电网投资,降低供能成本,提出一种基于主从博弈的配电网-多IES协调规划模型。确立配电网投资运营商(DSO)与IES投资运营商在供需互动下的主从博弈关系;利用奖惩协议提出考虑可靠性差异的DSO电价定价模型,在价格机制作用下,建立主从博弈规划模型,上层领导者DSO以利润最大为目标同时优化电价制定和扩展规划策略,下层跟随者各IES投资运营商以成本最小为目标同时优化规划和运行策略;通过算例验证了主从博弈规划方法能够提高各主体的经济效益,降低整体供能成本,同时分析了用户可靠性需求变化对各主体投资规划以及整体供能成本的影响。
In order to make full use of the potential reliability value of IES(Integrated Energy System)to delay the power grid investment and reduce the energy supply cost,a coordinative planning model of distribution system and mutiple IESs based on Stackelberg game is proposed.The Stackelberg game relationship between the DSO(Distribution System Operator)and IES operators under the interaction between supply and demand is confirmed.Then,the DSO pricing model considering reliability difference is proposed by using the reward and punishment agreement.Under the effect of price mechanism,the Stackelberg game planning model is established.The upper-level leader DSO optimizes the electricity price and expansion planning strategy with the maximum profit as the goal,while the lower-level follower IES operators optimize the planning and operating strategy with the minimum cost as the goal.A case study is given to verify that the Stackelberg game planning method can improve the economic benefits of all parties and reduce the overall energy supply cost.At the same time,the influences of the variation of user reliability demand on the investment planning of all parties and the overall energy supply cost are analyzed.
作者
刘畅
刘文霞
高雪倩
刘宗歧
邓诗语
刘耕铭
LIU Chang;LIU Wenxia;GAO Xueqian;LIU Zongqi;DENG Shiyu;LIU Gengming(State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources,North China Electric Power University,Beijing 102206,China)
出处
《电力自动化设备》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第6期45-52,共8页
Electric Power Automation Equipment
关键词
主从博弈
综合能源系统
配电网
可靠性
协调规划
Stackelberg game
integrated energy system
distribution network
reliability
coordinative planning
