人力资本显性激励与隐性激励的组合合同分析被引量：5

Studies on Combination Contract of Explicit and Implicit Incentives to Human Capital

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摘要本文主要是对企业家人力资本基于主观业绩的隐性激励合同与客观业绩的显性激励合同的组合激励进行的研究。文中首先分别提出显性激励合同模型与隐性激励合同模型,随之在静态分析的基础上,深入分析组合激励合同模型中相关参数的变化含义,并说明组合激励合同的意义:在一定约束下,可同时增加企业家和所有者的期望收入。 The paper analyses combinative incentive contract, including implicit incentive contract based on subjective performance and explicit contract based on objective performance to entrepreneur human capital. The implicit incentive contract and explicit incentive contract models are given firstly. On the base of static analysis, the change meaning of relative parameters in the model is deeply discussed and the significance of combination incentive contract is that the expected gains of the entrepreneur and the owner are increased under the restraints.

作者陈爽英唐小我马永开

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院电子科技大学管理学院

出处《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第6期108-112,共5页 Chinese Journal of Management Science

基金高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(20030614011) 国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002)

关键词隐性激励合同显性激励合同人力资本企业家 implicit incentive contract explicit incentive contract human capital entrepreneur

分类号 C936 [经济管理—管理学]

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参考文献11

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