摘要
本文运用博弈论的理论,建立了企业线性业绩模型和线性激励模型前提下的企业股东与经理激励-努力博弈分析模型,分析了完全信息条件下的股东与经理激励-努力动态博弈均衡,对求解获得企业经理努力变量、企业股东激励变量和经理业绩分享系数量变的取值、变化范围及其相互关系进行了范围广泛的分析,力图为企业激励机制的设计与研究提供借鉴。
An incentive-work-hard analyzing game model between stockholder and executive is founded based on the firm's achievement linearizing model and motive linearizing model in this paper.The dynamic equilibrium of game model under complete information is discussed.The executive's work-hard variable and stockholder incen-tive's variable are explained and the selected scope and interrelationship about these variables are analyzed fargo-ing.Some useful references for designing executive's motive mechanism are given.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2004年第5期116-119,共4页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金委员会国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(79725002)
关键词
激励
努力
动态博弈分析
完全信息
incentive
work-hard
game dynamic analysis
complete information
