摘要
由于传统物流具有较强的负外部性,因此在其基础上发展起来的一种新型物流模式—绿色物流,具有节约资源、保护环境的优点。然而,在完全竞争的市场环境下,企业基于自身收益和竞争力考量一般不会主动积极去实施绿色物流,而是实施一系列内外因素的作用下的最佳选择。为了探讨各种因素对企业实施绿色物流的影响,从物流绿色化过程中参与主体角度构建了一个包含政府、物流企业和用户的三方演化博弈模型,分析了不同情况下各方的演化稳定策略。在此基础上,运用Netlogo软件模拟了各方的初始参与意愿、政府补贴和处罚的力度以及企业投机行为被发现的概率对系统演化路径和演化结果的影响。结果表明,政府、物流企业和用户的初始参与意愿对系统演化结果有不同的影响。政府的补贴和处罚对企业和用户的策略选择有着重大影响,与用户相比,企业对政府补贴更为敏感;与处罚相比,政府补贴对企业行为选择的影响更大。此外,政府还应加强绿色物流的宣传,制定企业绿色物流的判断标准和评价体系,抑制企业投机行为的发生。
Due to the strong negative externalities of traditional logistics,the green logistics that developed from traditional logistics has the advantages of saving resources and protecting the environment.However,in the competitive market environment,enterprises will not implement green logistics based on their own revenues and competitiveness and,instead,will choose the best choice from the actions of a series of internal and external factors.To explore the effect of various factors on the implementation of green logistics by enterprises,this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the governments,logistics enterprises,and users from the perspective of the participants in the process of logistics greening and analyzes the evolutionarily stable strategies of each participant under different situations.Netlogo software is used to simulate and analyze the initial willingness of the participants,the intensity of government subsidies and fines,and the probability that the enterprises’speculative behaviors are founded on the system’s evolutionary paths and results.The results demonstrate that the initial willingness of the governments,logistics enterprises,and users to participate has different effects on the evolutionary results of the system.Government subsidy and fine measures significantly impact the strategic choices of enterprises and users.Compared with users,enterprises are more sensitive to government subsidies,and compared with fines,government subsidies have a greater impact on enterprises’behavior choices.Moreover,the governments should strengthen the publicity of green logistics,formulate judgement standards and an evaluation system for green enterprise logistics,and restrain the speculative behaviors of enterprises.
作者
董雨
杨婷婷
Yu Dong;Tingting Yang(School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)
出处
《中国科学技术大学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第9期34-46,I0002,I0003,共15页
JUSTC
基金
the National Natural Science F oundation of China(71973001)。
关键词
绿色物流
演化博弈
政府规制
green logistics
evolutionary game
government regulation
