摘要
社区体育公共服务供给治理作为推动社区体育公共服务治理体系和治理能力现代化的关键环节,其实质是不同利益群体为获得各自利益而反复博弈的动态演化过程。如何有效协调各主体之间利益关系,促进多元主体有序参与并实现共同治理,是提升社区体育公共服务供给治理质效的重要保障。运用文献资料和逻辑分析等方法,基于演化博弈理论构建体育服务企业、体育主管部门、体育社会组织和社区居民四方协同博弈模型,深入探讨社区体育公共服务供给治理质效提升的最优策略,并利用MATLAB 2021仿真分析了各关键要素对系统演化的影响。研究表明:(1)体育主管部门实施宽松监督时,系统存在三种可能的演化稳定点,分别为(1,0,0,0)、(1,0,0,1)和(1,0,1,1);(2)增加惩罚额度可以有效约束体育服务企业治理行为,但长期以往不利于体育主管部门自身履职,容易造成供需错配;(3)持续提升奖励收益可以有效调动体育服务企业积极参与,但难以实现体育主管部门自我减负和提升体育社会组织自我管理和约束能力,不利于提升社区体育公共服务供给治理质效;(4)增加社区居民参与治理激励额度可以显著调动居民参与治理积极性,防范体育服务企业越位和失范等行为,但缺乏与体育社会组织有效沟通交流,不利于提升社区体育公共服务供给质量和水平。提升策略:制度建设引导有序参与,搭建多元协商共治平台;健全协同治理监督机制,制定实施动态绩效考评;加强政策资金支持力度,强化组织自我造血功能;拓宽居民参与激励方式,畅通体育信息反馈渠道。
As a key link to promote the modernization of community sports public service governance system and governance capacity, community sports public service supply governance is essentially a dynamic evolution process in which different interest groups repeatedly play games to obtain their own interests. How to effectively coordinate the interest relationship between various subjects, promote the orderly participation of multiple subjects and achieve common governance is an important guarantee for improving the quality and efficiency of community sports public service supply and governance. This paper uses the methods of literature review and logical analysis to construct a four-party collaborative game model involved in sports service enterprises, sports authorities, sports social organizations and community residents based on evolutionary game theory, and deeply explores the optimal strategy for improving the quality and efficiency of community sports public service supply governance, and use MATLAB 2021 to simulate and analyze the influence of each key element on the system evolution. The research shows that:(1) When the sports authorities implement loose supervision, there are three possible evolutionary stable points of the system, namely(1,0,0,0),(1,0,0,1) and(1,0,1,1);(2) Increasing the amount of punishment can effectively restrain the governance behavior of sports service enterprises, but it is not conducive to the performance of the sports authorities themselves in the long run, and it is easy to cause a mismatch between supply and demand;(3) Continuously increasing reward income can effectively mobilize active participation of sports service enterprises, but it is difficult to reduce the burden of sports authorities and improve the self-management and restraint capabilities of sports social organizations, which is not conducive to improve the quality and efficiency of community sports public service supply and governance;(4) Increasing the incentive quota for community residents to participate in governance can significantly mobilize resident participation in governance enthusiasm and prevent offside and anomie behaviors of sports service enterprises, but lack of effective communication with sports social organizations is not conducive to improve the quality and level of community sports public services. It is proposed to guide orderly participation through system construction, build a platform for multi-level consultation and co-governance;improve the collaborative governance supervision mechanism, formulate and implements dynamic performance evaluation;strengthen policy and financial support, and strengthen the organization’s self-hematopoietic function;widen the way of encouraging residents to participate and unblock the channel of sports information feedback.
作者
王俊涵
李荣日
WANG Junhan;LI Rongri(Research Institute of Sports Economics,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai 200237,China)
出处
《山东体育学院学报》
北大核心
2022年第4期36-47,共12页
Journal of Shandong Sport University
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(编号:18BTY061)。
关键词
社区体育公共服务
供给治理
多元主体
动态演化博弈
community sports public service
supply management
multiple subject
dynamic evolutionary game
