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寡头市场价格领导的反垄断法应对——以主要快递企业集体涨价为例证 被引量:3

Anti Monopoly Law Response to Oligopoly Market Price Leadership--Taking The Collective Price Rise of Major Express Delivery Enterprises as An Example
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摘要 主要快递企业集体涨价使“价格领导”成为值得关注的对象。价格领导是指在相关市场中某一企业先行上调价格,其他企业相继跟随涨价的现象,其以寡头型市场结构为必要前提,以涉案企业间不存在直接意思联络为主要特征。以结构主义为起点的共同市场支配地位制度不能有效回应该现象,行政执法与司法裁判对该制度的适用亦存在误区与僵化。基于默示通谋的回应性规制是解决问题的主要途径。寡头市场的相关属性使经营者更倾向于将其他主要竞争者的价格水平作为自身定价的起点,致使经营者仅通过单方行为即可实现意思联络。以寡头市场的相关属性为基础,特定的行为特征可使价格领导被认定为默示通谋。价格领导现象以寡头型市场结构为前提,这意味着规制者可通过经营者集中等制度对市场结构采取措施,以预防价格领导出现。 The collective price rise of major express delivery enterprises makes"price leadership"an object worthy of attention.Price leadership refers to the phenomenon that one enterprise raises the price first and other enterprises follow the price rise one after another in the relevant market.It takes the oligopoly market structure as the necessary premise and the main feature is that there is no direct contact between the enterprises involved.The common market dominant position system based on structuralism can not effectively respond to the phenomenon,and there are misunderstandings and rigidity in the application of administrative law enforcement and judicial judgment to the system.Responsive regulation based on tacit collusion is the main way to solve the problem.The relevant attributes of oligopoly market make operators more inclined to take the price level of other main competitors as the starting point of their own pricing,so that operators can realize meaning communication only through unilateral behavior.Based on the relevant attributes of oligopoly market,specific behavior characteristics can make price leadership recognized as implied collusion.The phenomenon of price leadership is based on the oligopoly market structure,which means that regulators can take measures to prevent the emergence of price leadership through business concentration and other systems.
作者 郭传凯 Guo Chuankai
机构地区 山东大学法学院
出处 《竞争政策研究》 2022年第1期20-30,共11页 Competition Policy Research
基金 山东省市场监督管理局公平竞争审查评估及反垄断课题研究项目(SDLZ-2021-138) 互联网法治研究院(杭州)2021年度互联网法治重点研究课题、山东大学人文社会科学创新团队项目“全面依法治国战略实施中的数据运用与数据治理”资助。
关键词 寡头市场 价格领导 共同市场支配地位制度 默示通谋 回应性规制 预防性规制 Oligopoly Market Price Leadership Common Market Dominant Position System Implied Collusion Responsive Regulation Preventive Regulation
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