摘要
解决食品安全信息不对称的根本途径在于构建完善的食品安全信息交流体系。本文基于参与主体的行为分析,分别构建政府部门与食品企业、食品企业与消费者之间的动态博弈模型,通过对比分析信息不对称与信息对称两种情况下均衡解的变化,说明构建食品安全信息交流的必要性及改善博弈均衡解的具体途径。最后,文章结合我国现有信息交流的壁垒,提出针对性的改进建议。
The basic way to solve the information asymmetry in food safety is to build a perfect information communication system. Based on analysis of the main participations' behaviors, this article builds two dynamic game models between government department and food enterprise, food enterprise and consumers Respectively. By comparing the equilibriums under informational asymmetry with those under informational symmetry, the necessity of constructing food safety information exchange and specific ways to improve the game equilibriums are showed. In addition, combined with the problems existing in our country' s information communication mechanism, corresponding improvement suggestions are proposed.
出处
《上海经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第5期66-74,共9页
Shanghai Journal of Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"健全食品安全质量标准和监管体制研究"(项目编号:10YJA630160)
关键词
食品安全
信息交流
博弈论
Food Safety
Risk Communication
Game Theory