摘要
随着工业化的快速发展,严峻的环境污染问题日益凸显,政府环境规制成为社会性规制的重要内容。本文基于规制经济学,以及规制过程中的博弈研究基础,采用博弈论分析方法,研究了政府实施排污税环境规制下企业与政府之间的博弈关系。通过构建博弈模型分析认为,政府的排污税率、谎报罚金等指标以及企业自身的排污技术水平、排污谎报带来的声誉损失影响企业污染上报量、环境治理等环境策略,但是监管强度并不能直接影响企业的排污水平。因此应通过完善环境规制政策、激励企业技术创新以积极开展污染治理工作,提高环境规制效率。
With the rapid development of industrialization, environmental pollution problem is getting worse. Environ- mental pollution regulation is an important part of the social regulation. Based on Regulatory Economics, environmental regulation and game analysis, the paper studies game between government and enterprise when government choosing emission tax as environmental regulation measure. By constructing a game model,the result indicates that： emission tax rate, penahy of enterprise violations, and green technology and reputation losses of company have effects on enterprise＇ s environmental strategy including reported pollution quantity and environment management, while different environmental regulation cannot affect enterprise＇ s pollution level directly. Therefore, improving the social responsibility consciousness, perfecting the environment regulation policy, inspiring technology innovation incentive is required to carry out pollution control work actively, and to enhance our country＇ s environmental regulation efficiency.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期35-40,共6页
Forecasting
基金
黑龙江省自然科学基金资助项目(G201131)
黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(12E037)
关键词
环境规制
企业环境行为
动态博弈
最优策略
技术创新
environmental regulation
corporation environmental behavior
dynamic game
optimal strategies
technology innovation
