摘要
放松第三市场模型假定条件,引入企业技术许可这一策略性行为,建立一个四阶段的双寡头研发竞赛博弈模型,利用非合作博弈中常用的逆推归纳法,来考察具有不完全议价能力的竞争企业各自的政府在考虑消费者剩余时最优的研发政策。研究结论表明:首先,各国政府对本国消费者剩余的考虑影响其对本国企业研发的补贴率,进而影响竞争企业的研发行为。其次,只有当技术领先企业进行较小程度的非显著创新时,技术许可这一策略性行为才会对政府的研发政策产生影响。最后,在不同的技术许可策略下,双边政府最优的研发政策不同。对许可企业而言,该国对其研发的补贴率在固定费许可下要高于在产量提成许可下的情况。而在一定的技术许可策略下,许可双方企业对议价能力的预期则会明显影响各自政府的研发政策。如在产量提成许可下,对被许可企业而言,该国对其研发的补贴率随着自身议价能力的降低反而增大。
Involving strategic behavior of enterprises＇ technology licensing, the assumption of the third market model is released. And a game model of four - stage duopolistic R＆D rivalry is established by means of backward induction used usually in the uncooperative game theory. The optimal R＆D policies considered consumer surplus by respective governments when competitor has incomplete bargaining power is examined. Results and conclusions are as follows： Firstly, consideration of consumer surplus by country affects subsidy rate for enterprise＇ s R＆D, and thus R＆D behavior of competitor. Secondly, the strategic behavior of enterprises＇ technology licensing has impacts on government R＆D policies only when technology leader makes minor non - drastic innovation. Finally, bilateral government optimal R＆D policies are different in different strategies of technology licensing. Con- cerning the licensor, the R＆D subsidy rate by its government is higher in fixed -fee licensing than that in output -royalty licensing. Meanwhile, the expectation of bargaining power by both licensor and licensee affects respective government R＆D polices with certain technology licensing strategies. Under the condition of output - royalty licensing, the R＆D subsidy rate by its government is reversely higher with the reduction of its bargaining power concerning the licensee enterprise.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期88-96,共9页
Science Research Management
