大股东行为影响公司价值的理论模型解释被引量：23

A Theoretical Model to Interpret the Ways of Large Shareholders′Behaviors Affecting Corporate Value

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摘要通过考虑第一大股东监管行为选择和股权制衡对第一大股东行为所施加的约束,扩展了La Porta等提出的关于大股东行为影响公司价值的分析模型。新的模型将大股东行为对企业价值的正负作用以及不同股权结构对其行为选择的影响置于统一框架中,运用数学推理和比较静态分析方法得出企业股权结构对于公司价值影响的一系列命题。研究结果表明,公司价值与非第一大股东所持股权的集中度和法律环境对中小股东的保护程度正相关;在无进一步假设的情况下,公司价值与第一大股东持股份额无确定性的单调关系;当第二大股东持股份额超过某一临界点时,其对第一大股东的有效股权制衡有利于公司价值的提升。现有的众多实证研究结果与上述理论推断的结论基本吻合。 This paper extends the theoretical model proposed by La Porta et al. in order to model the large shareholders＇ behaviors affecting corporate value within a unified frame, considering the constraint of first largest shareholders＇ selection of supervision and counterbalance. The propositions deduced by the methods of mathematical proofs and comparative static analysis show that ownership concentration of non-largest shareholders, the protection towards small shareholders by legal environment are all positive correlated with corporate value, while the definitive relationship between the amount of shares owned by the largest shareholder and corporate value is ambiguous. These propositions are fundamentally consistent with the most of existing empirical results.

作者秦志华徐斌

机构地区中国人民大学商学院武汉大学经济与管理学院

出处《管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第4期22-31,共10页 Journal of Management Science

关键词股权结构公司价值大股东行为堑壕效应激励效应 ownership structure corporate value large shareholders＇ behaviors entrenchment effect incentive effect

分类号 F276.6 [经济管理—企业管理]

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