摘要
以罗默的领导——跟随者模型为基础,设计了创新者——模仿者博弈模型,推导出企业自主创新与模仿概率的决定因素,并对自主创新与模仿的决定进行了经济学分析,从而为企业或政府的创新政策提供参考。
From the game-theoretic perspective, this paper develops a innovation -follower model based on the Romer＇s leader-follower model, deducing the key factors of enterprise~ independent innovation and follow rate, and gives economic analysis to the decision between independent innovation and follow, and so provides suggestion on policies in innovation to enterprises or governments concerned.
出处
《科学学与科学技术管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第4期68-70,共3页
Science of Science and Management of S.& T.
基金
江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目(06SJB630008)
关键词
自主创新
模仿
博弈分析
independent innovation
follow
game analysis
