摘要
本文研究了双头市场中的具有一定生命周期的产品开发竞争。产品的生命周期和产品开发的研发投入对双头市场的产品开发竞争均衡有着直接影响。在产品生命周期较短的情况下,无论研发成本高低,双头垄断竞争均表现为占先竞争。当产品生命周期较长时,如果技术竞争主要基于研发投入,质量竞争从占先竞争转变为具有跟随者优势的等待竞争。
This paper researches product development game with certain product life span in duopoly market. The life span and the costs of research and development （R＆D） have direct effects on the game＇ s equilibrium. If product life span is short and consequently the duopoly competition is mainly a preemption game, no matter whether R＆D costs are high or low. If technological competition is mainly R＆D effort-consuming, the game of quality competition changes its nature form preemption to a waiting game with second-mover advantage when long product life span.
出处
《科学学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第B12期196-200,共5页
Studies in Science of Science
关键词
双头垄断
产品开发
生命周期
second-mover advantages
market entrant
dynamic game
