摘要
责任共犯论和违法共犯论疏远了与法益侵害之间的关联性,以此考虑共犯的处罚根据,不仅难以获得教义学上的根据,而且还容易导致共犯处罚范围的不合理扩张。因果共犯论立足于自身行为与违法结果之间所存在的因果性来寻求共犯的处罚根据,在方法论上具有妥当性。在因果共犯论内部,纯粹惹起说超出了构成要件基准这一限定性框架,有违罪刑法定主义,并且该说否定了共犯不法对正犯不法的依存性,因而不当地扩张了共犯的处罚范围。修正惹起说和混合惹起说均肯定共犯的不法对正犯不法的依存性,在共犯的要素从属形式上,坚持限制从属性说。在此前提下,修正惹起说坚持共犯之间违法的绝对连带性;混合惹起说则主张,如果共犯本身存在违法阻却事由,则例外地否认共犯的违法性。相较而言,例外地承认违法相对性之混合惹起说更具妥当性,该说有利于合理地认定特殊的犯罪参与情形。
The liability accomplice theory and the illegality accomplice theory have both reduced their relevance to legal interest infringement.As a result,the analysis of the basis of punishment for accomplice through the application of these two theories would not only meet with difficulties in obtaining doctrinal basis,but also cause unreasonable expansion of the punishment scope of the accomplice.The causality accomplice theory seeks the basis of punishment in the causality between one’s own behavior and the illegal result,which is methodologically appropriate.Within the causality accomplice theory,the pure causing theory goes beyond the definitive framework of the benchmark of constituent elements and contravenes the principle of a legally prescribed punishment for a specified crime.Moreover,it negates accomplice illegality’s dependence on principal offender illegality,thus improperly expands the scope of punishment for the accomplice.Both mixed causing theory and revised causing theory affirm that the accomplice’s illegality depends on the principal offender’s illegality,and adhere to the limited dependency theory.Under this premise,the revised causing theory adheres to the absolute connection of illegality between accomplices,while the mixed causing theory proposes that,if the principal offender has a cause of illegality elimination,the illegality of the accomplice will exceptionally be denied.In comparison,the mixed causing theory is more appropriate because it admits the relativity of illegality exceptionally.Adhering to the mixed causing theory is conducive to the rational determination of special types of criminal participation.
出处
《环球法律评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期132-148,共17页
Global Law Review
