摘要
Nowadays, the network defence policy selection using game model of incomplete information ignores the type of the defender, which quantifies cost simply, resulting in unreasonable defence policies selection. Aiming at the problem, we use Bayesian game theory to model the active defence policy selection. We take the types of both the attacker and the defender into consideration. Besides, the traditional quantization method is enhanced. Then, we calculate the equilibrium of static Bayesian game. Based on the analysis of the equilibrium, we select the optimal defence policy through the prediction for attackers' actions. The paper calculates the defence effectiveness of defence policies and provides a defence policies selection algorithm. Ultimately, we present an example to verify the effectiveness of the method and model proposed in the paper.
Nowadays, the network defence policy selection using game model of incomplete information ignores the type of the defender, which quantifies cost simply, resulting in unreasonable defence policies selection. Aiming at the problem, we use Bayesian game theory to model the active defence policy selection. We take the types of both the attacker and the defender into consideration. Besides, the traditional quantization method is enhanced. Then, we calculate the equilibrium of static Bayesian game. Based on the analysis of the equilibrium, we select the optimal defence policy through the prediction for attackers' actions. The paper calculates the defence effectiveness of defence policies and provides a defence policies selection algorithm. Ultimately, we present an example to verify the effectiveness of the method and model proposed in the paper.
基金
supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 61303074 and No. 61309013
the Henan Province Science and Technology Project Funds under Grant No. 12210231002
