摘要
随着政府逐年减少对中欧班列运营企业的补贴,班列开行量的增速放缓,部分班列平台货源结构出现剧烈波动。本文将霍特林(Hotelling)模型中客户基于空间分布推广至基于货值分布的情形,构建一个包含地方政府、班列企业、海运企业和托运人的博弈模型,旨在确定最优政府补贴额度,并对班列和海运企业明确各自货源市场及制定运价策略进行探讨。首先,根据区域货物的价值分布和不同托运人在运输价格和时间上的偏好差异,构建地方政府、班列企业和海运企业的效用函数。然后,通过网格法求解不同补贴额度下的博弈均衡状态,并分析货值分布、边际运输成本和碳交易价格变化对政府效用和最优补贴值的影响。案例结果显示:当班列补贴值为1200 USD·FEU^(-1)时,政府效用达到最高,此时班列运输和海运的均衡定价分别为8969 USD·FEU^(-1)和4273 USD·FEU^(-1);价值超过252847 USD·FEU^(-1)的货物更倾向于高时效性的班列运输,而低于此价值的货物则偏好低成本的海运;取消班列补贴将导致班列企业竞争力急剧下降和政府效用减少,故地方政府当前需对班列企业维持一定的补贴水平;未来,实现补贴完全退坡的关键在于降低班列运输的边际成本。
As the government gradually reduces subsidies to China Railway Express(CRexpress),the growth of train departures slows down,and the cargo structure on some CRexpress platforms experiences significant fluctuations.This paper extends the Hotelling model from customer spatial distribution to cargo value distribution,and proposes a game model that includes local governments,CRexpress companies,shipping companies,and shippers to determine the optimal government subsidy level and discuss how railway and shipping companies can clarify their respective cargo markets and set freight pricing strategies.Based on the regional cargo value distribution and shippers'preferences for transportation prices and time,this paper develops utility functions for local governments,railway express companies,and shipping companies.The game equilibrium state under different subsidy levels is solved using the grid method.The impact of changes in cargo value distribution,marginal transportation costs,and carbon trading prices on government utility and optimal subsidy values is also analyzed.The results from case study show that when the subsidy value for CRexpress is 1200 USD·FEU^(-1),government utility reaches its peak,with equilibrium pricing for CRexpress at 8969 USD·FEU^(-1) and 4273 USD·FEU^(-1) for shipping.The cargo values exceeding 252847 USD·FEU^(-1) prefer hightime-efficiency railway express,while the cargo below this value prefer low-cost shipping.Canceling subsidies will lead to a sharp decline in the competitiveness of CRexpress companies and a decrease in government utility,so local governments currently need to maintain a certain level of subsidies for CRexpress companies.In the future,the key to achieve complete subsidy withdrawal lies in reducing the marginal costs of CRexpress transportation.
作者
吴刚
杨锋
江山
郭茜
WU Gang;YANG Feng;JIANG Shan;GUO Qian(Tangshan Institute,Southwest Jiaotong University,Tangshan 063000,Hebei,China;School of Transportation and Logistics,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China;National United Engineering Laboratory of Integrated and Intelligent Transportation,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 611756,China)
出处
《交通运输系统工程与信息》
北大核心
2025年第1期289-297,共9页
Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金青年科学基金(71502147)。
