摘要
网络中发生攻击后,导致用户信息以及相关服务信息的隐私泄露和窃取,因此,研究基于博弈论的网络安全实战攻防策略。该策略基于攻击者和防守者之间的攻防交互情况,构建网络安全实战防护的三层斯塔克尔伯格竞争博弈模型,并在模型的第一层中,结合该偏好完成攻击者行为建模,以此分析攻击者的目标选择概率;并通过Stackelberg博弈强均衡策略算法,求解网络安全实战攻防最优策略。测试结果表明:自干扰因子取值为0.0005时,该策略对于主动攻击的防御性能良好,发送和协同干扰两种节点最高效用函数值分别为0.38和0.23,并且防守者的预期收益的变化结果处于相对平稳的状态,攻击者发起的6种攻击漏洞收益结果均在3.2以下,可有效地防御网络漏洞攻击,保证网络安全。
After an attack occurs in the network,the privacy of user information and related service information is leaked and stolen.In view of this,the paper makes studies on the actual-combat offensive and defensive strategy of network security based on game theory.Firstly,based on the interaction between attackers and defenders,the strategy is used to build a three-layer Stackelberg competitive game model of network security actual combat protection.Then in the first layer of the model,the attacker’s behavior is modeled according to the preference,so as to analyze the probability of attacker′s target selection.Finally,the Stackelberg game strong equilibrium strategy algorithm is used to solve the optimal offensive and defensive strategy of network security in actual combat.The test results are shown as follows:When the self-interference factor value is 0.0005,the proposed strategy has good defense performance against active attacks,and the highest utility function values of sending and cooperated interference nodes are 0.38 and 0.23,respectively.The change result of the defenders’expected return is relatively stable,and the return value of six-type vulnerability attacks launched by the attackers is all below 3.2.Thus,it can effectively defend against network vulnerability attacks and ensure network security.
作者
刘畅
罗思怡
周亮
LIU Chang;LUO Siyi;ZHOU Liang(Electric power Research Institute,State Grid Hubei Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,Wuhan Hubei 430000,China)
出处
《湖北电力》
2024年第4期110-116,共7页
Hubei Electric Power
关键词
博弈论
网络安全
实战攻防策略
攻防交互
斯塔克尔伯格竞争博弈模型
game theory
network security
actual offensive and defensive strategy
offensive and defensive interaction
Stackelberg competitive game model
