摘要
在上游供应受限的背景下,为保障供应链的有效运转,在品牌商采用“控制”采购模式的代工供应链中,引入一个存在产能限制及规模经济效应的供应商,构建制造商-品牌商的订货-价格决策模型(策略1)。以经典竞合模型为基础,建立制造商开通直销渠道的博弈模型(策略2)。通过对博弈模型进行分析,得到了供应结构中的均衡结果。结合解析和数值分析,说明了制造商接受极限高价采购(零部件)和搭便车采购两种情境下,竞合博弈的效果以及制造商的策略偏好。与以往模型不同,由于考虑了制造商和品牌商的零部件采购环节,从而形成了环形供应结构,并发现了以渠道交换订单的效应。研究结论可以为供应受限条件下制造商的转型升级提供建议。
In the context of upstream supply constraints,in order to ensure the effective operation of the supply chain,an decision model(Strategy 1)involving ordering and pricing decisions between the manufacturer and the brand owner is established in a supply chain where the brand owner adopts a"control"procurement mode,by introducing a supplier with capacity constraints and economies of scale.Furthermore,based on the classic competition-cooperation model,a game model(Strategy 2)is developed for the manufacturer to open direct sales channels.Through theoretical analysis of the game model,the equilibrium results in the supply network are obtained.Combining analytical and numerical analysis,the effects of competition-cooperation games and manufacturer strategic preferences are examined in two scenarios:the extreme high price procurement(for components)and the free-riding procurement.Different from the existing models,this study incorporates the component procurement processes of both manufacturers and brand owners,resulting in a circular supply structure and revealing the effect of exchanging orders through channels.The conclusions of this study can provide suggestions for the transformation and upgrading of manufacturers under supply constraints.
作者
贾涛
李媛媛
王雨蔷
林峰
JIA Tao;LI Yuanyuan;WANG Yuqiang;LIN Feng(School of Management,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China;The Key Lab of the Ministry of Education for Process Management&Efficiency Engineering,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China;School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108,China)
出处
《工业工程》
2024年第5期81-91,共11页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金重大资助项目(72192830,72192834)。
关键词
采购模式
竞合
产能受限
博弈
订货-价格决策
procurement mode
competition and cooperation
capacity constraints
game
ordering-price decision
