摘要
当前,很多软件开发商(如SAP、Oracle等ERP厂商)既通过下游的服务集成商(如埃森哲、德勤等咨询公司)向客户企业销售软件及服务,也直接向客户企业销售软件及服务。但在软件服务供应链管理领域,缺乏对这种开发商渠道入侵的相关研究。本文考虑由一个开发商与一个服务集成商、客户企业组成的软件服务供应链,分别针对开发商与服务集成商开展“授权”“授权+直销”两种合作模式进行了研究,比较了两种模式下,供应链成员的均衡决策、供应链成员利润与供应链绩效。研究发现:开发商的渠道入侵会降低开发商的软件销售利润,但可提高软件与延保服务销量并可增加开发商的延保服务销售利润,因此,当开发商急于抢占市场先机或扩大软件市场份额时,可选择“授权+直销”模式;当双方的竞争强度与开发商占据的市场规模均较小时,开发商的渠道入侵可提高集成商的利润以及供应链总利润;然而,当双方的竞争强度较小,且开发商占据的市场规模较大时,渠道入侵不仅会造成集成商的利润损失,也会造成供应链系统绩效损失;此外,当双方的竞争强度较大时,渠道入侵也会造成集成商的利润以及供应链系统绩效损失。
Currently,many software developers(such as SAP,Oracle,etc.)not only sell software to client enterprises through downstream service providers(such as Accenture,Deloitte,etc.),but also directly sell it to clients.However,in the field of software service supply chain management(SSSCM),there is a lack of research on the channel encroachment of software developers.In this study,a software service supply chain(SSSC)with a software developer,a service provider and client enterprises is considered.The clients can either purchase software(developed by the software developer)from the provider with a high price and additional pre-sale services,or directly purchase it from the developer with a low price but without pre-sale service.After purchasing the software,the clients can also purchase the extended warranty service from the developer.The two cooperation modes of“authorization”and“authorization+direct sales”are studied between the developer and the provider,and the equilibrium decision-making of SSSC members and the SSSC performance is compared in the two cooperation modes.It is found that the sales volume of software products and extended warranty services in the“authorization”model is less than that in the“authorization+direct sales”model;thus,the channel encroachment of the developer can increase the sales of software products and extended warranty services.In addition,the developer’s software product sales profit is higher than that in the“authorization+direct sales”model,but the extended warranty service sales profit is lower than that in the“authorization+direct sales”model;thus,the channel encroachment will reduce the developer's software product sales profit,but it can increase that of the developer's extended warranty service.Also it is found that when the intensity of competition between the two parties is weak and the market size occupied by the developer is small,the profit of the provider and the total profit of the SSSC are lower than those in the“authorization+direct sales”model;thus,the channel encroachment of the developer can increase the profit of the provider and the total profit of the SSSC.However,when the competition intensity is weak and the market size occupied by the developer is large(or when the competition intensity is strong),the profit of the provider and the total profit of the SSSC are higher than those in the“authorization+direct sales”model,and the channel encroachment will not only cause the profit loss of the provider,but also the performance loss of the SSSC.
作者
任廷海
周茂森
曾能民
Ren Tinghai;Zhou Maosen;Zeng Nengmin(College of Industry and Commerce,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550001,China;College of Management,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060,China;School of Economics and management,Harbin Engineering University,Harbin 150001,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第7期117-128,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72061004)
贵州财经大学校级重点项目(2020XZD02)。
关键词
软件服务供应链
渠道入侵
软件授权
销售策略
software service supply chain(SSSC)
channel encroachment
software authorization
sales strategy
