摘要
本文以2013—2021年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,从投资者风险感知视角实证检验交易所问询监管对股权融资成本的影响。结果显示:公司收到定期报告问询函后股权融资成本显著上升,并且同年收到定期报告问询函数量越多、同一份定期报告被问询次数越多、定期报告问询函中的问题总数量越多,股权融资成本上升幅度越大,说明交易所问询监管会增加投资者的风险感知,进而导致股权融资成本升高。异质性检验结果显示,当投资者专业能力较强、交易风险较大、市场化程度较低和审计质量较低时,投资者对定期报告问询函所披露风险的感知能力更强,交易所问询监管对股权融资成本的正向影响更大。进一步研究发现,作为一种非处罚性监管,交易所问询监管是处罚性监管的有力补充,二者都具有良好的市场监管效果。本文的研究结论为证券监管部门依法保护投资者合法权益和防范市场风险提供了政策参考。
Since the launch of the information disclosure“direct train”reform in 2013,stock exchanges have reviewed the annual,semi⁃annual,and quarterly reports disclosed by listed companies,and issued inquiry letters regarding issues such as inaccurate information disclosure or content ambiguities in these periodic reports,requiring the inquired companies to publicly respond within a specified period.Theoretically,exchange inquiry regulation has two different effects on the cost of equity financing.But,it has a risk transmission effect,indicating that the company has several problems in information disclosure or operations;on the other hand,it provides incremental information to investors,as companies will publicly respond to the inquiry letters and disclose detailed operational information,helping to alleviate information asymmetry and reduce the cost of equity financing.So,what impact does exchange inquiry regulation have on the cost of equity financing?This paper uses listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A⁃share markets from 2013 to 2021 as samples to explore the impact of exchange inquiry regulation on the cost of equity financing from the perspective of investor risk perception based on inquiry letters regarding periodic reports.This paper finds that the cost of equity financing is higher for companies that received periodic report questionnaires compared to those that do not receive periodic report questionnaires,and more inquiry letters are received within the same year,more times the same periodic report is inquired,and more issues raised in the inquiry letters lead to a more significant increase in the cost of equity financing.This indicates that investors are sensitive to the risk signals conveyed by periodic report inquiry letters,reassessing corporate risk and demanding corresponding risk premiums to protect their rights.Heterogeneity tests show that in the case of investors with stronger professional capabilities,higher market trading risks,lower marketization level,or poor audit quality,investors are more sensitive to the risks released by periodic report inquiry letters,exacerbating the effect of exchange inquiry regulation on increasing the cost of equity financing.Further tests show that as a main method of non⁃administrative penalty regulation,exchange inquiry regulation can serve as a powerful complement to punitive regulation.This paper finds that the periodic report inquiry letters issued by stock exchanges have a risk signal transmission effect,can increase investors’risk perception,and have a good investor protection function.The conclusions of this paper not only confirm that the inquiry regulation system is beneficial for exchanges to fulfill their investor protection responsibilities but also provide policy references for further innovating supervision methods.
作者
胡耀丹
王稳华
HU Yao-dan;WANG Wen-hua(School of Accounting,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650221,China;Yunnan Key Laboratory of Service Computing,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650221,China)
出处
《财经问题研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第5期62-74,共13页
Research On Financial and Economic Issues
基金
国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目“高管团队特征对企业数字化转型的影响研究”(72262033)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目“年报问询监管与上市公司融资行为研究”(20YJC630043)
云南省科技厅应用基础研究青年项目“党组织参与公司治理对民营企业投资活动的影响”(202001AU070057)。
关键词
交易所问询监管
股权融资成本
定期报告问询函
风险感知
投资者保护
exchange inquiry regulation
equity financing cost
regular report inquiry letter
risk perception
investor protection
