摘要
在诠释实体企业金融化的动机时,现有文献主要分析了收益动机,而实际上风险动机也同样存在。通过构建带有异质性高管的企业投资决策模型以及来自A股上市非金融企业的实证分析可以发现,企业金融化与金融市场风险有着显著的负向变动关系,金融市场风险是企业金融化的重要影响因素,企业金融化存在明显的风险动机。高管金融背景对企业金融化的风险动机形成倒U型调节关系,随着企业中有金融背景的高管比例上升,企业对金融市场风险的反应先减弱后增强,而这种调节作用部分通过管理层分歧来实现:当两类高管的数量相当时,实体企业对金融投资的管理分歧最大。此外,极端市场风险下企业有风险越大、投资越多的“彩票型”投资偏好。实证结果表明,实体企业金融化的风险动机受高管金融背景和金融市场状态的影响,当管理层分歧严重、极端市场出现时应当关注风险动机失灵问题。
When interpreting the motives behind the financialization of real entities,existing literature primarily focuses on profit motives,yet in reality,there are also risk motives.By constructing a model of enterprise investment decisions made by heterogeneous executives and conducting an empirical analysis on non-financial enterprises listed on the A-share market,it is found that there is a notable negative relationship between enterprise financialization and financial market risks,which is a crucial influencing factor in enterprise financialization;and enterprise financialization has significant risk motives.The executives’financial background exhibits an inverted U-shaped adjusting effect on the risk motives of enterprise financialization.As the proportion of executives with financial backgrounds in the enterprise increases,the response of the enterprise to financial market risks weakens and then strengthens.This adjusting effect is partly realized through management dissent:when the numbers of two types of executives are roughly equal,the real entity management dissent regarding financial investments reaches its peak.Additionally,under extreme market risk,an enterprise tends to have a preference for“lottery-type”investments,namely,investment increases when the risk gets larger.The empirical results suggest that the risk motives behind enterprise financialization are influenced by executives’financial backgrounds and the state of the financial market.When management dissent is pronounced and extreme market conditions arise,attention should be directed to malfunctioning risk motives.
作者
帅昭文
SHUAI Zhao-wen(School of Economics,Minzu University of China,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《兰州大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期163-176,共14页
Journal of Lanzhou University（Social Sciences）
关键词
企业金融化
金融市场风险
高管金融背景
异质性高管
管理层分歧
enterprise financialization
financial market risk
executives’financial backgrounds
heterogeneous executives
management dissent
