摘要
为有效减少地铁施工人员不安全行为,提高安全管理制度有效性,从地铁施工人员与安全管理人员双方的利益动机出发,构建不安全行为惩罚的演化博弈模型,通过系统动力学(systematic dynamics,SD)模型对双方博弈的演化趋势进行仿真模拟,最后提出能够降低不安全行为的策略。研究结果表明:两方博弈模型的均衡解不具有演化稳定性,且增大惩罚力度只能在短期内减少不安全行为,而重复博弈上下震荡的频率更大,安全管理检查更加困难;引入动态惩罚机制并优化可以达到稳定的演化均衡,在有效抑制波动的同时减少不安全行为发生,达到最稳定状态,获得稳定策略,在不检查的情况下,施工人员选择安全行为,降低事故发生的可能性,为制定有效的惩罚制度提供了一定的参考。
In order to effectively reduce the unsafe behavior of subway construction workers and improve the effectiveness of safety management system,starting from the interest motivation of subway construction personnel and safety managers,an evolutionary game model of unsafe behavior punishment was constructed,and the evolutionary trend of the game was simulated by system dynamics(SD)model.Finally,strategies that can reduce unsafe behavior were put forward.The results show that the equilibrium solution of the two-party game model does not have evolutionary stability,and increasing the punishment can only reduce unsafe behavior in the short term,while the frequency of up and down oscillation of repeated game is greater,and the inspection of safety management is more difficult.The introduction and optimization of dynamic punishment mechanism can achieve a stable evolutionary equilibrium,effectively restrain the fluctuation,reduce the occurrence of unsafe behavior,achieve the most stable state,and obtain a stable strategy.Without inspection,the construction personnel choose safe behavior and reduce the possibility of accidents.The study provides a certain reference for the formulation of effective punishment system.
作者
陈赟
刘慧琳
CHEN Yun;LIU Hui-lin(School of Transportation Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410114, China)
出处
《科学技术与工程》
北大核心
2022年第13期5506-5512,共7页
Science Technology and Engineering
基金
2018年湖南省应急管理厅安全生产科技研究及推广项目(201801)。
关键词
不安全行为
演化博弈
动态惩罚机制
系统动力学
稳定性分析
unsafe behavior
evolutionary game
dynamic punishment mechanism
system dynamics
stability analysis
