摘要
为探究区块链技术在生鲜农产品流通过程中如何保障质量安全,利用演化博弈方法探究监管部门与生鲜农产品生产商关于生鲜食品质量安全溯源博弈过程.构建监管部门与生鲜农产品生产商的质量安全溯源的博弈支付矩阵,并进一步确立质量安全溯源的复制动态方程.通过对二维复制动态系统进行求解初步得到系统的平衡点,再分析平衡点的局部稳定性情况.结果显示,当生产商生产质量安全生鲜产品的收益大于生产不安全生鲜产品的收益时,双方博弈将最终演化到理想状态(1,0),即生产商将生产质量安全的生鲜农产品而监管部门选择不监管.由此可知,当生产商生产质量不安全的产品会获得更多收益时,监管部门可以采取罚金的方式来规范生产商安全生产.
In order to investigate how blockchain technology can guarantee quality safety in the circulation of fresh agricultural products,this paper used evolutionary game to explore the game process of quality safety traceability between regulators and fresh agricultural products producers.The game payment matrix of quality and safety traceability between regulators and fresh produce producers was constructed,and the replication dynamic equation of quality and safety traceability was further established.The equilibrium point of the system was initially obtained by solving the two-dimensional replicated dynamic system,and the local stability situation of the equilibrium point was analyzed.The results showed that the game will eventually evolve to the ideal state(1,0)when the benefits of producing quality-safe fresh produce are greater than the benefits of producing unsafe fresh produce,which means the producer will produce quality-safe fresh produce and the regulator will choose not to regulate it.Consequently,when the producers will gain more by producing unsafe quality products,the regulator can adopt fines to regulate the producers’safe production.
作者
郑艺
徐耀群
邱泽国
ZHENG Yi;XU Yao-qun;QIU Ze-guo(School of Computer and Information Engineering,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin 150028,China;Institute of System Engineering,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin 150028,China)
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2021年第4期506-512,共7页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce：Natural Sciences Edition
基金
黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目(20GLE390)“基于区块链技术的生鲜农产品质量安全研究”.
关键词
区块链
生鲜农产品
演化博弈
质量安全
溯源
blockchain
fresh agricultural products
evolutionary game
quality&safety
traceability
