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基于碳标签制度的两级供应链协调机制研究 被引量:15

Two-echelon Supply Chain Coordination Strategy Based on Carbon Labeling System
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摘要 以市场需求随机的视角建立Stackelberg博弈模型,研究基于碳标签制度的供应商和零售商组成的两级供应链协调策略。模型引入产品碳足迹e1作为决策变量,分别研究了在收益共享与成本共担契约下集中决策和分散决策中决策变量最优解及最优利润的变化情况。研究结果表明,在考虑碳排因素时集中决策相比于分散决策具有明显的优势;在参数满足一定条件下零售商通过与供应商共担碳减排成本,可以实现利润的增长,初步验证模型的契约设计的有效性。 A Stackelberg Game model is built based on a random perspective of market demand and a research is pus forward on two-level supply chain coordination strategy consisting of suppliers and retailers based on the carbon labeling system.Assuming that the market needs random and perfect competition,Stackelberg game model is constructed with the two-level supply chain consisting of suppliers and retailers as the research object.First,the optimal carbon footprint,optimal order batch and maximum objective function of these two factors in decentralized and centralized decision-making are solved.Secondly,it can be seen that centralized decision is better than decentralized decision after the comparison between decentralized decision variables and optimal values of objective functions.Then,on the basis of the centralized decision theory,the cost sharing coefficient variable of reducing carbon footprint and the gain sharing coefficient variable are introduced for two objective functions,and the optimal solution of the coefficient variable of optimal carbon footprint and optimal order batch is obtained.Finally,according to the example analysis and sensitivity analysis,the optimal value of carbon footprint,order quantity and objective function in the case of centralized decision is obviously better than that of decentralized decision.Moreover,the effect of contract decision is equivalent to centralized decision,and the variation range of centralized decision and contract decision is apparently larger than that of two decision variables under decentralized decision.The carbon emission problem is not a zero sum game problem.The carbon footprint is taken as a variable to build the cost sharing and benefit sharing model,which can be regarded as a feasible solution.
作者 潘永明 邹丁华 张志武 PAN Yong-ming;ZOU Ding-hua;ZHANG Zhi-wu(School of Management,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300380,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2021年第1期109-115,共7页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(17FGL009) 天津市人文社科基地项目。
关键词 STACKELBERG博弈模型 碳标签制度 决策 共担契约 碳减排成本 stackelberg game model carbon labeling system decision sharing contract carbon emission reduction costs
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