摘要
随着入网的电动汽车规模增加,为了实现电网与车主的双赢不仅要考虑其无序充放电对电网负荷的影响,还要计及双方的成本。基于此,建立了主动配电网与电动汽车主从博弈模型。上层以配电网运行成本最低为目标,通过合理的电价及激励策略引导电动汽车充放电,并协调优化分布式电源及储能;下层基于贪心策略进行两阶段优化,先以分时电价下充放电成本最低为目标优化充放电策略,在不减少收益的约束下,再最大化电网对减小负荷波动给予的激励调整策略。通过改进的IEEE 33节点系统算例分析表明,该模型在最大化双方利益的同时极大地缩小了负荷峰谷差,避免了大量电动汽车充电引起新的高峰。
With increasing penetrations of electric vehicles,both the grid-side impact and cost of disorderly charging and discharging should be taken into account,which contributes to achieving a win-win situation between the power grid and electric vehicle owners.Hence,a Stackelberg game model between the active distribution network and electric vehicle owners is established.The upper layer aims at minimizing the operating cost of the distribution network,and guides the charging and discharging of electric vehicles through reasonable electricity price and incentive strategy.At the same time,the dispatch of distributed generators and energy storages are coordinated.The lower layer performs a two-stage dispatch based on greedy strategy.Firstly,the charging and discharging strategy is optimized with the goal of minimizing cost under the time-of-use electricity price.Then,without reducing the revenue,the strategy is adjusted to maxi mize the grid’s incentive revenue for reducing load fluctuations.Numerical results of a modified IEEE 33-bus system indicate that the proposed model greatly reduces the peak-to-valley difference while maximizing the revenue of both parties.In addition,the new demand peaks caused by charging of a large number of electric vehicles are avoided.
作者
张潇
栗然
马涛
回旭
刘英培
ZHANG Xiao;LI Ran;MA Tao;HUI Xu;LIU Yingpei(School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,North China Electric Power University,Baoding 071003,China)
出处
《电力自动化设备》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第4期103-110,共8页
Electric Power Automation Equipment
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(51607069)。
关键词
主动配电网
电动汽车
主从博弈
贪心策略
两阶段优化
峰谷差
active distribution network
electric vehicles
Stackelberg game
greedy strategy
two-stage optimiza-tion
peak-to-valley difference
