摘要
控制权治理是公司治理的重要内容,由控制权配置带来的控制权收益是激励投资家物质资本和企业家人力资本投入的重要手段。基于不完全契约理论,从控制权收益和企业家人力资本的视角,研究公司创业投资支持企业的控制权配置问题。分析创业企业中公司创业投资者与企业家的控制权收益构成和类型以及企业家的人力资本专用性和专有性特征,厘清公司创业投资者与企业家各自私人收益、货币收益与其拥有的企业剩余控制权和特定控制权之间的对应关系。根据控制权共享收益来源,构建基于企业家人力资本专用性和专有性的控制权共享收益函数,分析控制权私人收益和战略收益、企业家人力资本专用性和专有性以及控制权收益与人力资本交互作用对公司创业投资支持企业剩余控制权和特定控制权配置的作用机理。以公司创业投资支持的110家不同行业上市企业3年数据为样本,运用面板数据混合回归模型,实证检验控制权收益、企业家人力资本及其交互项对中国经济背景下公司创业投资支持企业两类控制权配置的影响。研究结果表明,公司创业投资者拥有的特定控制权和剩余控制权与企业家人力资本专用性正相关,与企业家人力资本专有性负相关,企业家控制权私人收益对公司创业投资者获得创业企业特定控制权比例具有正向影响,公司创业投资者控制权战略性私人收益对其自身获得创业企业特定控制权比例具有负向影响;企业家控制权私人收益正向调节企业家人力资本专用性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系,负向调节企业家人力资本专有性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系;公司创业投资者战略性私人收益负向调节企业家人力资本专用性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系,正向调节企业家人力资本专有性与公司创业投资者剩余控制权占比之间的关系。由于不同产业类型的创业企业会给公司创业投资者和企业家带来不同的控制权收益,进而导致双方对控制权的关注程度和类型发生变化。同时,处于不同发展阶段的创业企业,公司创业投资者和企业家对剩余控制权、特定控制权关注的重点也不相同。因此,需要对不同类型的创业企业进行控制权分类治理。研究结论为完善公司创业投资支持企业的控制权治理、提升控制权激励效果进而促进被投资创业企业发展具有重要的理论参考价值。
Control right governance constitutes an essential part of corporate governance.Control right benefits, resulting from the allocation of control right serve as an important incentive to attract investment, be it physical capital from venture capitalists or human capital from entrepreneurs.Based on the incomplete contract theory, this study examines control right allocation in corpo-rate venture capital （ CVC）-backed firms.And control right benefits are analyzed from the prospective of corporate venture capi-talists and entrepreneurs in CVC-backed firms, including specific and exclusive characteristics of entrepreneurs′human capital. Furthermore, this study clarifies the relations between private and shared benefits, pecuniary returns, and residual and special control right of CVC investors and entrepreneurs. The sources of control right shared benefits are also analyzed from the prospective of the specificity and exclusiveness of entrepre-neurs′human capital to determine the interactions between private and strategic control right benefits, the specificity and exclu-siveness of entrepreneur human capital, and their impacts on the allocation of CVC-backed firms′residual and special control right. Based on the three-year data of 110 listed CVC-backed firms in diversified trades and panel data for a mixed regression model, this study empirically analyzes the influence of control right benefits, entrepreneurs′human capital, and their interactions in terms of the allocation of two types of control right（residual and special） of CVC-backed firms in the setting of China′s economy. The results show a positive correlation with the specificity of human capital and a negative correlation with the exclusiveness of human capital between CVC investors′residual and special control right.Entrepreneurs′strategic private benefits of control right have a positive impact on the CVC investors′special control right ratio, whereas the CVC investors′control right strategic private benefits have a negative impact on his special control right ratio.Entrepreneurs′control right private benefits positively moderate the relation between the specificity of human capital with CVC investors′residual control right and negatively moderate the rela-tion between the exclusiveness of human capital and CVC investors′residual control right.The CVC investors′strategic private benefits of control right negatively moderate the relationship between specificity of human capital and CVC investors′residual con-trol right and positively moderate the relationship between exclusiveness of human capital with CVC investors′residual control right. The empirical results indicate that since CVC-backed firms in different trades can bring different control right benefits to investors and entrepreneurs.Consequently, the focus of CVC-backed firms on control right and its types changes accordingly.Therefore, it is necessary for different types of CVC-backed firms to implement classified governance over the control right.These findings have important theoretical reference value in improving CVC-backed firms′control right governance and control right motivation.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期80-93,共14页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71102093)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助重点项目(JUSRP51330B)~~
关键词
公司创业投资
创业企业
控制权配置
人力资本
共享收益
corporate venture capital
venture enterprises
control right allocation
human capital
sharing benefit
