摘要
对1994年分税制改革及其后果的举例分析表明,大量上访和群体性事件显示的公共治理危机既是地方人大制度运转不良的结果,也源于央地关系失衡对地方政府形成的逆向激励。新一轮司法改革的根本动力,是击碎司法地方保护主义的硬壳,以诉讼方式将涌入上访渠道的社会矛盾解决重新地方化。由此,虽然司法改革会被强力推进,但基于对司法功能的过度期待而设计的改革措施既与法理规律存在紧张,也将加重法院本已沉重的案件压力和功能负荷,削弱其赖以安身立命的独立、专业和稳定品质,长远来看反而不利于既定改革目标的实现。回应治理困境的权宜之计,一方面是凭借中央权威平衡央地人、事、财权关系以减少滋生社会矛盾的外部激励,另一方面是将"矛盾回应型"司法改革转向"规则确认型"司法改革以促进央地关系的优化。
Through an analysis on the tax distribution system in 1994 as well as its incurred consequences, this article shows that the governance crisis manifested by collective appealing and assembling events is due to both malfunction of local people＇s congress system and adverse incentive to local governments caused by the imbalanced relations between central and local authorities. The real driving force for the new round of judicial reform is to eliminate local protectionism and to relocalize the solution of social disputes in appealing via litigations. Therefore, despite the forceful execution, the judicial reform is likely to hinder the reform as planned in the long run, because the reforming strategies, whose precondition is extra reliance on judicial function, will contradict with juridical principles, pose burdens on the settlement on the existing thorny eases and threaten its independence, professionalism and stabilized quality. In order to combat the challenges, the reformer, on the one hand, should strike a balance in relations of personal, material and financial rights so that the external excitation of social conflicts will be reduced. On the other hand, to improve the central-and-local relations, the ＂conflicts-responding＂ mode of judicial reform should be gradually replaced by the ＂rules-affirming＂ mode.
出处
《中国法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期127-142,共16页
China Legal Science
基金
国家社科基金项目"我国法院的非司法负担及其影响"(项目批准号:13BFX067)
中国法学会"中央与地方关系对司法改革的双重影响"(项目批准号:2015D024)的阶段性成果
