摘要
Amid the recent global upsurge of studies on the philosophy of emotion, a reinterpretation of traditional Confucian philosophy, especially Mencius＇s ideas on the siduan （Four Original Sources） of morality, may shed new light on the subject in comparative philosophy. This paper probes the structure of moral feeling and reason described by Mencius＇s from five perspectives： （1） In view of the relationship between feeling and reason, is it better to use the expression ＂siduan＂ or the expression ＂sixin （Four Heart-minds）＂？ （2） In view of dispositional feeling, what are the four original sources？ （3） In view of moral feeling, what are the structural order of the four sources and the corresponding procedure of reasoning of four heart-minds of Humanity？ （4） In view of positive feeling, how does moral feeling grow out of the goodness of human nature？ （5） What is the global value of Mencius＇s ideas on human moral feeling？ The author concludes that Mencius＇s thought on moral feeing has a global value and cross-cultural significance, and that Chinese wisdom is more than regional but universally applicable. The structure of moral feeling and reason that Mencius identified is in accordance with the principles ofzhiliang （grasping the two poles of the beginning and the end） and yongzhong （emloying the middle）. The principles ofzhiliang and yongzhong are true universal wisdoms of Confucianism, which should be rekindled today. From a practical point of view, ＂the Way begins from moral feelings,＂ and Confucius and Yah Hui＇s seeking the simple, virtuous life is an ideal model of emotional well-being.
