摘要
控制性股东向上市公司进行专用性资产投资,产生了资产专用性问题,资产专用性的特性使资产投资方的违约成本增加。控制性股东在这样的前提下对上市公司进行专用性投资,向契约各方传递了一种可置信承诺,承诺对契约的履行,减少投机行为以保证契约双方的利益实现。然而,资产专用性的行为效应存在着噪音,两权分离是一个研究视角,随着控制权与现金流权的分离度加大,控制性股东因为获得超额收益而不惜牺牲中小股东的利益,使约束力减弱。
Controlling shareholders produced an issue of asset specificity while making specific assets investment of listed companies. The asset specificity characteristics enable asset investors to increase the cost of default. Thus, controlling shareholders make specific investments of listed companies in this context, inherent to deliver a credible commitment to the contracting parties, commit to fulfill the contract and reduce speculation in order to ensure the interests of both contract implementation. However, there are noises exist in the behavioral effects of asset specificity. From the point of view of the separation of ownership, with the widening separation of control rights and cash flow rights, controlling shareholders can get excess returns at the expense of the interests of minority shareholders, make them binding weakened.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第8期101-106,共6页
On Economic Problems
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71072095)
国家自然科学基金重点项目(71132001)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地--南开大学公司治理研究中心重大项目(13JJD630004)
天津财经大学科研发展基金项目(2014Q140119)
天津市哲学社会科学规划后期资助项目(TJGLHQ1405)
关键词
资产专用性
可置信承诺
行为
约束效应
asset specificity
credible commitment
behavior
confinement effect
