摘要
1939年底至1941年初,在应对因国民党的驱赶政策而产生的新四军危局中,毛泽东和中共中央提出并实施了将新四军战略重心向长江以北地区转移的方针。在实施过程中,毛泽东和中共中央始终立足全局,灵活辩证地指导江南新四军北移行动的或急或缓,华北八路军南援计划的或备或启,皖南事变中军事政治应对的或攻或守,最终促使蒋介石政府不得不承认新四军坚持在长江以北地区自主抗战与发展的事实。新四军的危局在反击皖南事变的斗争中被破解,构成了第二次反共高潮后国共关系向有利于中共方面转变的关键。
By the end of 1939 to early 1941,on the solutions to N4 A crisis arising from the policy of expelling by the Kuomintang,Mao Ze- dong and the CPC central committee proposed and implemented a policy that the strategic focus on the New Fourth Army will transfer to the north of the Yangtze River. In the process of implementation,Mao Ze- dong and the central committee of CPC have always been based on the whole situation,dialectically flexible on the guidance of the action of north transfer of south N4 A in a slow or fast speed,the Eighth Route Army of the North China in South Transfer plan on preparation or in action,and military and political solutions to the Southern Anhui Incident in attack or defense,hence the Chiang Kai- shek government had to admit the fact that the N4 A insisted on anti- Japanese war and development autonomously in the north of the Yangtze River. The crisis of the N4 A was cracked in the struggle to fight back Southern Anhui Incident,and constituted the key to the beneficial transition to Central Committee on relation of the KMT and the CPC after the second anti-Communist onslaught.
出处
《安徽史学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期142-153,共12页
Historical Research In Anhui
关键词
新四军
战略重心北移
皖南事变
毛泽东
N4A
north transfer in strategic focus
the Southern Anhui Incident
Mao Ze-dong
