摘要
我国政府对于企业生产新能源汽车的扶持补贴力度逐步加大,但实际与预期效果仍有较大差距。基于演化博弈理论建立政府与汽车企业策略交往的博弈模型,用数值仿真展示初始条件与参数取值变化对演化结果的影响。研究发现,汽车企业与政府行为的演化路径既可以向良好状态演化也可能趋于不良"锁定",通过调节参数可以跳出不良"锁定"。相关探讨可为政府制定产业政策提供一定参考。
Support from government for new energy vehicles has gradually increased, but the actual effect still has a wide gap with the expected. Based on evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary model is built to show the behavior interaction between government and vehicle enterprise. The influence of decision - making parameters on evolution results is discussed. The effect of variety of original condition or decision - making parameters on the evolution results are shown by numerical experiments. It is found that the evolution of the system converges in two patterns： an ideal status and a bad one. Through control of parameters, evolution of the system can be guided to good direction. Discuss of this paper are helpful for decision of industry poliey.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第11期75-79,共5页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目"基于计算实验方法的排污权交易系统优化设计"(71201071)
国家自然科学基金项目"基于计算实验方法的企业环境行为分析与引导策略研究"(71171099)
江苏大学高级人才科研启动基金项目"基于顾客感知的企业技术系统演化研究"(12JDG127)
关键词
新能源汽车
产业政策
演化博弈
政府补贴
new energy vehicle
industry policy
evolutionary game
government subsidies
