摘要
文章在考察环境不确定性对上市公司投资行为影响的基础上,分析了股权激励计划对这一相关关系的影响机制和作用效果,结果发现:企业所面临的环境不确定性会降低企业投资效率,导致过度投资或投资不足。而股权激励措施对不确定环境引起的管理者非效率投资行为有抑制作用。本文研究结果表明,股权激励制度有助于减少环境不确定性导致的代理矛盾,抑制过度投资,也有助于降低企业管理者风险的厌恶程度,缓解投资不足。
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between option- based compensation and investment behavior of listed companies under uncertainty. We find that firms' inefficient investment behavioris increasing in uncertainty. And this negative effect of environment uncertainty on investment is mitigated if executives are compensated with option. The results support the view that option-based compensation can reduce risk-related agency problems between managers and shareholders,helping to restrain the overinvestment behaviors and mitigate the effect of risk aversion on investment.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期41-48,95,共8页
Accounting Research
