摘要
构建了制造商和零售商的纳什博弈和斯塔克尔伯格博弈两种博弈结构形式,分析了低碳研发成本分摊系数和政府低碳补贴等方面对供应链低碳化研发投入的影响,得出不同博弈形式下的企业低碳研发合作和政府补贴策略。
This paper selects Nash game and Stackelberg game between manufacturer and retailer, discuss the influence to R＆D costs of low carbon supply chain on cost allocation coefficient and government subsidies, and conclude the strategies between low carbon R＆D cooperation and government subsidies under different game situation.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期21-26,31,共7页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71072155
70771073)
内蒙古大学高层次人才引进科研启动项目(135144)
关键词
低碳供应链
成本分摊
政府补贴
低碳投入
博弈论
low carbon supply chain
cost allocation
government subsidies
low carbon investment
game theory
