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Review on the Study of the Allocation of Corporate Control in Enterprise Theory 被引量:1

Review on the Study of the Allocation of Corporate Control in Enterprise Theory
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摘要 With the establishment of a modem corporate system, the separation of ownership and management appears in the company. The rational allocation of corporate control between different behavioral agents has attracted more and more attention. This paper points out that scholars have studied the allocation of corporate control from the angles of the agency cost theory, property rights theory, corporate finance theory, and the theory of corporate governance, which has great value. However, the existing theories also have some flaws on the allocation of corporate control. First, people still have different understandings and views over the meaning of corporate control. Secondly, the existing research theoretically only observes and studies an arrangement of sheer level control, the allocation between final control and real control. This paper argues to build the two-tier allocation of corporate control: The first tier relation is between ultimate control rights and actual control rights, the second tier relation is between indirect control rights and direct control rights which are in actual control rights. This study can explain the resource allocation effects of corporate control, promote the development and improvement of the theory of the firm.
出处 《Chinese Business Review》 2013年第7期477-482,共6页 中国经济评论(英文版)
关键词 corporate control allocation of rights corporate governance 现代企业制度 合理分配 控制权 行为主体 产权理论 企业融资 公司治理 电平控制
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