摘要
在传统的基金治理结构中,基金管理人大多采用经理型模式,基金管理人的道德风险的发生难以避免。对基民与基金管理人的委托—代理合同进行优化,重激励、轻约束,不能从根本上消除基金管理人的道德风险。要消除基金管理人的道德风险,必须实现基金管理人从经理型向股东型的彻底转变,将基民与基金管理人的关系由传统的基金运行模式中的股东与经理的关系改造为优先股东与普通股东的关系。基金管理人的股东化转型,相对于经理型基金管理人而言,至少有两大功能:对基金管理人的机会主义行为的矫治功能;对基金管理人能力的甄别功能。
In playing the role moral hazard in the traditional of professional that context. T governance structure of fund management, Fund managers are agent. It is difficult to avoid the occurrence of Fund manager＇s he optimizations of principal-agent contract between the investors and fund managers focus on the incentive of managers, giving a little importance on the constraint to mangers. It is impossible to avoid the fund manager moral risk unless the mangers are transformed from agent to stockholder. At that time, the relationship between the fund manager and investors will become priority shareholders and ordinary shareholders instead of shareholders and agent. By this way, it is good for avoiding the opportunism behavior of fund managers, and at the same time, it also set up barriers to entry to this position.
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第4期30-34,共5页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173243)
关键词
基金管理人
治理结构
经理型
股东型
Fund manager
Governance structure
Agent
Shareholder type
