摘要
航空机票价格同时影响航空公司和旅客这对博弈行为的双方.分析了航空公司和旅客之间动态博弈行为,讨论了旅客出行成本,在此基础上将整个预售期上的博弈问题转化为航空公司的单人博弈问题,兼顾考虑了No Show及旅客对航空公司收益的影响,根据经济学理论中价格影响市场需求的规律,利用定价决策来调节机票销售数量实现超售限制,建立的动态定价模型包含超售因素.算例仿真验证了模型的实用性.
The both sides of game behavior of airline and passengers are influenced by air fare. The dynamic game behavior between airline and passengers was analyzed to discuss the trip cost of passen- gers. The game problem in entire pre-sale stage was transferred to the one-person game problem of airline with considerations of No-Show and passenger influence on airline earning. According to the rule in economics theory of price influencing market demands, the sale of the air tickets was regulated with the pricing decision to realize overbooking limit. The overbooking factor was included in the proposed dynamic pricing model. The practicability of the model was verified by example simulation.
出处
《江苏大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2013年第4期481-485,共5页
Journal of Jiangsu University：Natural Science Edition
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(60736045)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60472130)
