摘要
本文研究在信息严重不对称的食品市场上,如何通过信息揭示提高食品安全规制的效率。在现有的制度环境下,由于受到行政资源的局限,规制者在检测和监管方面存在技术及人为的偏差,企业有机会采用成本更低的不良生产技术。研究表明,以社会监督为核心的信息揭示是提高食品安全的有效途径。规制者根据食品安全生产的要求和特点,界定企业需要揭示哪些生产和交易环节的信息,能够为社会、第三方、相关监管部门提供监督的平台。尽管企业可能提供虚假信息,但由于引入了社会各方面资源的监督,企业的不良行为更加容易被发现,并可能承担严厉的社会惩罚,企业生产劣质食品的动机降低。揭示信息会增加单个企业的成本,但是整个行业的可信度得以提升,消费者支付意愿增加,最终行业利润提升,激励企业向更安全转型。研究进一步发现,尽管价格管制能够提高消费者福利,但会导致食品安全整体水平下降,降低社会总福利。
This paper investigates the food safety regulation in the presence of the information asymmetry. Due to the limitation of regulatory resources, the imperfect detection technology and inspector＇s personal bias may give firms incentive to adopt the less costly production technology, which may have unsafe impact on consumers＇ health. The result shows that an efficient way to improve food safety is to require firms disclosing information destined for social supervision. The regulator defines the kind of information that firms must disclose according to the requirement and specialty of food safety production. In doing so, the regulator establishes an information platform for the supervision of various parties in the society, including the third party, consumers and relevant inspectors. Although firms may provide false information, the introduction of various social supervision makes it more likely for the cheating firm to be detected and suffer more severe punishment from the society. This reduces firms＇ incentive to adopt unsafe technology. In spite of the cost increase of all firms, the credibility of the industry increases, and hence raises the consumers＇ willingness to pay and the profit of the safe firms. This, in turn, gives incentive for firms to switch to safer technology. The analysis on efficiency of price intervention shows that, although a price ceiling can increase consumer surplus, it reduces the overall level of food safety and hence the social welfare.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第3期135-147,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK120217)资助
关键词
食品安全
规制
信息不对称
信息揭示
责任制度
： Food Safety
Regulation
Information Asymmetry
Information Disclosure
Liability
