摘要
高管与大股东的减持是重要的内部人交易行为,也是深圳创业板市场大幅波动及下跌的重要原因。对高管的减持行为从多个不同角度进行研究后发现:高管减持的幅度大大超过其增持,高管减持的交易频次更多来自竞价交易方式,但大宗交易减持的总量占据着明显的主导;在高管职务方面,董事兼高管的减持幅度最大,其次为董事,高级管理人员与监事减持的总量相对较少,且交易特征也更相似;辞职套现的高管更多地出现在中监事、董事与总经理等职务。对风险投资与产业资本的减持统计显示,前者减持股份更多,后者减持的强度更大,券商直投减持尚未面临全面减持问题。研究结论为考察创业板内部交易及高管治理提供了新思路,也为加强限售后交易监管、改善投资者保护提供了新的依据。
Senior Executives and big stockholders＇ reduction of holdings are both insiders＇ trading as well as the main cause of violation and falling of Shenzhen GEM. This paper studies senior executives＇ reduction of holdings in several different perspectives and finds out that the volumes of senior executives＇ reduction of holdings are much higher than increase, and price- competing transactions are much block ones, while it is the exact opposite in the aspect of transaction volume. For different positions, the reduction of holdings is quite different ; directors who also are senior management reduce their holdings the most in volume, directors follows the second, the supervisors and senior management are fairly the third and the same in reduction and its behavior. We find lots of resignations for reduction, which covers the almost all positions in senior executives. The reduction of venture capital, industrial capital and investment bank capital is also discussed comparatively in this paper. The findings provide several new ideas for GEM insider trading supervision and senior executives governance, as well as some updated evidences for insider trading supervision and investors protection after the lockups expiration.
出处
《南都学坛（南阳师范学院人文社会科学学报）》
2013年第1期122-127,共6页
Academic Forum of Nandu:Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Nanyang Normal University
基金
教育部人文社会科学规划基金"我国个人所得税深层次改革的相关问题研究"
项目编号:09YJA790027
关键词
创业板
高管
大股东
减持
GEM
senior executives
big shareholders
shareholding reduction
