摘要
基于Holmstrom and Milgrom(1991)的多任务代理理论,本文论证了在经济发展初期,加大对地方政府促进经济增长等容易度量指标的激励,以维持经济持续高速增长,并弱化对地方政府提供基本公共服务等不易考核指标的激励,是给定政治集权体制下中央政府的最优选择路径。但若持续地采取这种高能激励手段,经济增长将会和居民福利的提高渐行渐远,并将会对未来持续的经济增长造成损害。
Based on Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) multi-task agency theory,this paper argues that in the early period of economic development,increasing local governments’ incentives in indicators which can be easily measured,such as economic growth rate,and weakening the incentives in indicators not easy to measure,such as public services provision,is the optimal choice for the central government under the given political centralization conditions.However,if central government continues to provide such high-powered incentives,economic growth will drift apart from the residents’ welfare and the sustained economic growth in the future will be ruined.
出处
《金融评论》
2011年第1期94-100,125,共7页
Chinese Review of Financial Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助的一般项目"劳动定价与收入差别"(08JA790009)的研究成果之一
关键词
多任务
地方政府
高能激励
经济增长
Multi-task
Local Government
High-Powered Incentives
Economic Growth
