摘要
国企高管与员工间的薪酬差距成为近年来的焦点话题之一,本文首次提供了我国国企内部薪酬差距与企业绩效之间关系的直接经验证据。研究结果表明,国企高管和员工间的内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,从而支持锦标赛理论。并且,本文的结论不随企业绩效和内部薪酬差距的不同衡量方法而改变,在考虑二者之间的内生关系后仍然成立。进一步的研究还表明,内部薪酬差距的激励强度随地区及公司间差异而不同,并随年度和地区呈现出显著的边际递减效应。
Salary difference between the top executives and the employees of state-owned enterprises becomes a focus for its upward trend years after years. However, we know a litter about this field so that our policies of pay reform in state-owned enterprises display ambiguous even opposite directions. For example, on the one hand, the government encourages the firm to apply an equity incentive plan, which leads to enlargement of the salary difference between the top executive and the employees. On the other hand, they try to decrease the effect of salary difference by restricting the maximum wage of top executive. It is fact that there exist two competitive hypotheses to predict the economic consequences of intra-firm salary difference. One focus on the role of the social justice called social comparison theory, which insisted that equity is more important. The other is tournament theory, which pays more attention to competition effect of intra-firm salary difference. In the two theories, which one is better to explain the phenomena? There hasn't a consistent conclusion. So, it becomes an important and interesting topic to test the economic consequence of salary difference between the top executive and the employees in our country.Using state-owned listed enterprises as sample and selecting 2004 to 2007 as our research period, this paper studies the effect of the salary difference of state-owned enterprises on the firm performance at the first time in our country. In spite of accountings for endogeneity problem and using different measurement, we still find that there is significant positive relation between salary difference and firm performance, which supports the tournament theory, Further study also indicates that the incentive effect is unequal for different regions, Specifically, the incentive effect is stronger in the middle and west region. At the same time, we find that the incentive effect is stronger in firm which has low employee salary or more information about labor-market. Further study also finds that the incentive effect shows significant marginal decrease effect. Moreover, the marginal decrease effect is gradually weakened as the year goes on and the speed of decreasing is more pronounced in the coastal areas than the Midwest.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期30-39,51,共11页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532003)
国家自然科学基金项目(70872116)资助
关键词
内部薪酬差距
企业绩效
锦标赛理论
社会比较理论
Salary Difference
Firm Performance
Tournament Theory
Social Comparison Theory