摘要
本文运用多元博弈理论分析了县级政府与各博弈主体间信用缺失的原因。在一次性博弈中,县级政府与各博弈方陷入囚徒困境,引发短期信用缺失行为;而在多重博弈理论的指导下,政府守信度大幅提升。基于此,本文提出了加强县级政府信用信息公开,完善信用监督,强化官员的失信责任追究,建立守信激励约束机制,健全信用监管法律体系等治理县级政府信用缺失的策略,通过建立重复性博弈机制,提升县级政府的信用程度。
Here we use multi- game theory to analyze the main reasons for credit deficiency on county government and the other players;in the one-off game,county government and the other players get into a Prisoner＇s Dilemma,leading to a short-term credit loss behavior.Under the multiple game theory,the credit deficiency has improved.So we put forward some countermeasures,such as strengthening the county government＇s credit information open,consummating credit supervision,intensifying accountability the officials who break their words,establishing incentive and restriction mechanism for keeping one＇s word,founding a legal system of supervi- sion,by the establishment of a repetitive game mechanism we hope to upgrade the level of county government credit status quo.
出处
《行政与法》
2009年第9期1-4,共4页
Administration and Law
关键词
博弈理论
县级政府
信用
信用缺失
game theory
county government credit
credit deficiency
countermeasures
