摘要
随着家族上市公司的数量不断增多,对家族企业的研究也越发显得迫切和重要,然而目前在我国,对于家族控制是否有利于上市公司的发展,理论界始终没有形成统一、全面的评价。本文借助股权分置改革的契机,以"对价"这个囊括公司表现、市场评价、投资者预期等各方面因素的综合指标为切入点,利用该指标的综合性与预期性优势,重新审视家族控制对我国上市公司的影响。以2006年底进行股改的上市公司为样本,研究发现家族控制有利于我国上市公司的发展,市场给予良好的评价,其在全流通过程中支付的成本较低;对家族分样本进一步分析得出,直接上市的家族企业比买壳上市的家族企业总体表现更好;聘请职业经理人管理的比家族成员直接参加管理的上市公司市场评价更高。
The research of family-controlled listed companies has been an urgent issue given their fast development in Chinese capital markets. Existing literature does not have a consistent idea on whether family-controlled listed companies perform better than non-family listed companies. This article focuses on the opportunity of split share structure reform, and takes the consideration ratio as a new perspective for studying whether family control is beneficial for listed companies in China. Generally speaking, companies with better performance and corporate governance will undergo lower price impacts, and investors will claim less compensation from non-tradable shareholders in the split share structure reform. The consideration ratio in split share structure reform has some predominance in syntheses and anticipation than other indicators in order that we can survey family-controlled listed companies in China capital market from a new perspective. From our sample of companies that finished reform before 31 Dec 2006, we find evi- dence that family control is beneficial to listed companies, and in split share structure reform family-controlled listed companies have significantly lower consideration ratios than other listed companies. In a sub-sample of family-controlled companies, additional analysis suggests that family-controlled companies listed by IPO show better performance, and have significantly lower consideration ratios than companies going public through a reverse merger. Furthermore, family members serving as board directors or CEO is a good signal for family-ontrolled listed companies, and the consideration ratios in such cases are significantly lower than for other companies. Our evidence suggests that shareholders in family-controlled listed com- panies agree to non-tradable shares getting tradable rights at lower costs because they have better consideration for family-controlled listed companies than other listed companies.
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第1期40-48,共9页
Nankai Business Review
基金
教育部研究生教育创新项目--南京大学国际化会计学博士生项目(IAPHD)资助
关键词
家族控制
股权分置
对价
Consideration Ratio
Family-controlled Listed Companies
Split Share Structure Reform
