期刊文献+

矿业权交易效率与矿业权交易中心角色定位 被引量:8

Transactional efficiency of mining rights and role orientation of mining rights exchange center
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摘要 由于矿业权及其交易的特殊性,矿业权人在交易矿业权时,有很强的提供虚假信息以牟利的机会主义动机,从而增加矿业权市场交易的费用。如果某矿业权人将多次转让矿业权,尽管其同某一特定的受让人可能只交易一次,但若能使其以后的潜在受让人低成本地获知其在过往的转让交易中是否诚实的信息,那么该矿业权人就有树立和保持声誉的激励,抑制机会主义动机,而在每次转让交易中保持诚实,从而降低交易费用,提高交易效率。我国现有的矿业权交易中心,就可以通过收集矿业权人在过往的交易活动中是否诚实的信息,并把它提供给潜在的受让人而扮演一种新的角色。 Due to the special nature of mining rights and its transaction, when owners of mining rights transact, they will have strong motives of opportunism to give false information about the mining rights to seek profits, which will increase the transaction costs of mining rights. If an owner of mining rights transfers mining rights many times, despite he transacts with a particular assignee only one time, if his later potential assignees can obtain the information that he was honest or not in his past transactions, he will have incentive to restrain his opportunism motives and maintain honesty in each transaction in order to establish and maintain reputation, which will reduce transaction costs and improve transaction efficiency. China's existing mining rights exchange center can play a new role by collecting the information about assignors' activities in the past transactions and providing it to their later potential assignees.
作者 晏波
出处 《中国矿业》 北大核心 2009年第1期25-28,共4页 China Mining Magazine
关键词 矿业权 矿业权交易中心 机会主义 声誉 mining rights mining rights exchange center opportunism reputation
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参考文献5

  • 1晏波.矿业权不同转让方式比较[J].中国矿业,2008,17(5):9-12. 被引量:10
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二级参考文献6

  • 1晏波,安琼伟.政府声誉与采矿权价值[J].中国矿业,2007,16(7):21-23. 被引量:3
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引证文献8

二级引证文献49

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