摘要
近年来,我国开始频繁使用准备金率工具来对冲银行体系流动性,但法定准备金要求作为一种税收,可能类似于其它政府税收,会存在一个最优准备金率。当法定准备金率上调到某一水平之后,反而会由于"税基"的流失而导致准备金率工具在流动性管理和货币控制中的功能弱化。本文基于微观经济主体最优化行为,建立了一个理论模型和分析框架,并进行了相应的计量检验和实证分析。主要结论为:当前我国的最优准备金率为23%左右,如果提高到23%以上,准备金率工具对冲流动性和控制货币信贷的效果反而会适得其反,这时就需要通过调整存贷款利率、存贷款利差和准备金存款利率等方式来进一步拓展准备金率工具的使用空间。但随着利率市场化的不断推进,存贷利差将会发生变化,准备金率工具的使用空间也可能会受到制约。
In recent years, PBC has carried out monetary policy by means of reserve requirements policy frequently in an effort to drain the excess liquidity in the banking system. But just like other government taxes, reserve requirements maybe have an optimal required reserve ratios（RRRs）. When the RRRs have been over-raised to the optimal level, the effect of reserve requirements policy in money control and liquidity sterilization should also be withered due to the loss of the ＂tax base＂. Thus, we establish a theoretical model and analysis framework and make the corresponding econometric test and empirical analysis. The main conclusions are as follows ： The optimal RRRs in China at present is about 23 percent. If the RRRs need be further raised above 23 percent, the monetary authority should adjust the deposit and loan interest rates, the bank spreads or the reserve requirements interest rate to expand the use space of the reserve requirements policy.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第7期65-77,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
中国人民银行重点课题"改进和完善我国存款准备金制度"的研究成果之一
关键词
准备金税
最优准备金率
货币控制
货币政策
Reserve Requirements
Reserve Requirement Tax
Money Control
Monetary Policy
