摘要
运用我国A股上市公司2002～2004年的数据,本文研究上市公司两个股权结构变量——股权集中度与股权制衡度——对会计盈余信息质量特征之一的会计稳健性的影响。研究表明,股权集中度高的上市公司将不利于会计盈余信息质量的提高,少数大股东可能通过及时确认"好消息"以及滞后确认"坏消息"的方式来掩盖对中小股东的"掏空"行为,会计盈余稳健性较低;而股权制衡度较高的上市公司会计盈余就有较高的稳健性,这将有利于抑制少数大股东对会计盈余信息的操纵从而保护中小投资者财富不受侵占。
Using data of A-share listed companies in China from 2002 to 2004, this paper researches on shareholder structure variables such as convergence and balance which may have influence on qualitative characteristics of accounting earning information such as accounting conservatism. We find evidence that high convergence of ownership structure has negative influence on the improvement of accounting earning information, and our results support the claim that ＂good news＂ may be more timely reflected in accounting earnings than ＂bad news＂ because it may be that large shareholders have an incentive to conceal the ＂tunneling＂ of listed companies. We also suggest that listed companies which have better balance of ownership structure have better accounting earning conservatism that can protect other shareholders＇ benefits from being infringed by large shareholders.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第3期40-48,共9页
Securities Market Herald
关键词
大股东
稳健性原则
股权集中
股权制衡
large shareholders
conservatism principle
convergence of shareholder structure
balance of shareholder structure
