摘要
江河提供了非常丰富的“非排它性”资源服务,因此容易陷入“公地悲剧”。历史上对长江、黄河等江河所提供的多维度要素资源价值理论认识上的滞后及误区,是引发此类江河向“公地悲剧”演变的基础性原因。现行的江河管理体制不能有效地协调中央与地方、地方与地方、部门与部门之间的资源行为及利益关系,从而诱发了地方等主体对江河资源的不相容使用和过度进入,而成为加速推进这一演变进程的制度性根源。在这一体制下,地方在与中央的博弈中,谋求当期地方收益的最大化;地方之间的财政逆向转移与升职竞争博弈,加剧了地方的行为扭曲;部门之间的边界模糊与势力竞争博弈,诱发了部门的行为扭曲。只有创立新的江河管理体制,才能规范地方等主体的行为,避免江河的“公地悲剧”命运。
There are so many types of ecosystem services offered by the rivers, so that it can be considered in the scope of river services, resulting in ＂tragedy of the commons＂. The government has adaptive administration strategies in order to maintain certain behaviors and sustainable development of resources. However, this government forces cannot modify the evolutionary trend of tragedy. This paper analyzed the economic, politic and management reasons for the ＂tragedy of the commons＂ of rivers and some measures for revising the resources behaviors of rivers. In all measures, it would be established that both nonexcludability rights including resource properties and management authority and proper pricing mechanism on use of ecosystem services in the future.
出处
《长江流域资源与环境》
CAS
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第3期315-319,共5页
Resources and Environment in the Yangtze Basin
关键词
生态服务
公地悲剧
制度
博弈
ecosystem services
tragedy of the commons
institutions
game
