摘要
运用实物期权与博弈论相结合的方法,研究在不确定的竞争环境中,面临竞争对手抢先投资威胁时,企业的最优R&D投资时机。研究表明,竞争促使企业提前进行R&D投资,从而消减了企业R&D投资等待期权的价值。同时发现,市场需求的不确定程度越高,投资成本越高,企业越晚投资,而抢先投资的先动优势越大,企业越早投资。
By using real option and game-theoretic approach, the paper examines the optimal timing of firm＇ s R＆D investmerit under uncertainty and the threat of preemption from the rivalries. It shows that competition makes finns advance investment, which may undermine the waiting option value of R＆D investment. It also finds that the more the degree of market demand uncertainty and investment costs are, the earlier the firm invests; while the more the first - mover advantage is, the later the finn invests.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2006年第6期18-21,共4页
Commercial Research
