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论官员激励中的声誉机制 被引量:6

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摘要 本文基于对声誉实施机制的分析,指出重复博弈、可预期的未来利益、畅通的信息传播渠道、有效的排斥行为是声誉制度实施的四大条件。在此基础上,作者讨论了中国当前政府官员声誉激励中存在有效预期缺乏、信息渠道不畅、排斥机制缺失等问题,提出了建构我国政府官员声誉制度的具体措施:(1)确定官员激励中的利益原则;(2)改革官员职务晋升制度;(3)确立信息公开制度;(4)加大对机会主义行为的处罚力度;(5)营造一个歧视机会主义的社会环境。
作者 韩俞 陆舞鹄
出处 《经济体制改革》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第6期43-47,共5页 Reform of Economic System
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