摘要
农村税费改革中三个利益主体中央政府、地方政府和农民的博弈可以看作是宏观和微观两个层次的博弈,地方政府是将这两个博弈层次连接起来的纽带。通过建立双层次互动进化博弈模型来分析达到进化稳定均衡的过程,要达到这个过程也是宏观层次的“选择”和微观层次的“突变”过程,是一个重复博弈的过程。结合对模型的分析和我国现行的农村税费改革,可以得到三点启示:考虑三方博弈主体的利益;鼓励微观层次的突变;避免地方政府的“寻租”行为。
The games of three beneficial entities-central and local governments and peasant can be classified into the games of Macro and Micro levels, with the local government serving as the link in-between. The process of reaching evolutional balance and stability is analyzed through the establishment of the double level mutual evolutionary game model, the completion of which is a mutual integrated process of macro level “selection” and micro level “mutation” or a repetitive game process. The revelations for the reformation of our present rural tax system can be obtained through such a model analysis.
出处
《南京农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2005年第1期24-28,共5页
Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
农村
税费改革
双层次
进化博弈
rural
tax reform
double levels
evolutionary game
