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再论中国地方政府主导型市场经济 被引量:55

Re-debate of Regional Government Guided Market Economy in China
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摘要 本文着重研究以强烈扩张冲动为主要特征的中国地方政府主导型市场经济。①笔者将企业经营者个人控制权理论运用于地方官员,认为官员个人控制权扩张有三条途径,而中国目前地方官员主要运用横向扩张途径以获得自我晋升。中国地方政府强烈的扩张冲动,不同于西方的地方自治和中外历史上的封建诸侯,而是产生于以下全部的必要条件和充分条件:在中国初期市场经济②的特定条件下,必要条件是地方官员横向扩张个人控制权特别强劲的动力,充分条件是地方资源完全的“内公外私”产权③与公共选择制度两者约束的显著失效。 The thesis emphasized on the research of regional government guided market economy, which characterized in strong passion for enlargement. Applying the theory of personal controlling power in corporate management to local officials, the authors showed that there are three ways for the officials to enlarge personal controlling power. Otherwise, the local officials mainly use the way of sidewinder enlargement to get promotion nowadays. The strong passion for the enlargement of regional government in China is different from regional autonomy in western world. It resulted from all necessary condition and full condition, that is, with the special background of preliminary market economy in China, necessary condition is strong passion of the enlargement for personal control power in sidewinder of local officials, full condition is the invalid both limitation of public executive system and the property right of inner public-owned and outer private-owned of regional resources.
作者 何晓星
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第1期31-38,共8页 China Industrial Economics
关键词 地方政府主导 扩张冲动 个人控制权 内公外私 地方自治 regional government guided passion for enlargement personal controlling power Inner public-owned and outer private-owned regional autonomy
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